Schools as tactical targets in conflict. What the case of Nepal can teach us by Wessel, M.G.J., van
  1 
Schools as tactical targets in conflict: What the case of Nepal can teach us 
Margit van Wessel and Ruud van Hirtum 
 
Accepted for publication in Comparative Education Review 57/1 (2013), p. 1-21 
 
 
Abstract 
 
That school grounds, students and staff can become tactical targets for parties in conflict is 
widely accepted as a fact by analysts of education and conflict. However, our understanding of 
the motivations for such targeting remains limited, as does our ability to engage with this matter 
through policy. In this article we explore tactical targeting of schools in Nepal in order to deepen 
our understanding of this phenomenon. Our key argument is that schools offered important 
qualities and resources to parties in conflict. We distinguish physical and symbolic qualities and 
resources that are human and financial in nature, and we explain how and why these played a 
role in the targeting of schools. We conclude that if we seek to protect schools, children and 
school staff from being targeted, it may be well worth temporarily decreasing schools’ societal 
prominence in comparable cases in which our argumentation may apply, such as rural areas in 
low-income countries.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, connections between education and conflict have received greater attention 
among scholars, practitioners, and organizations in the field. Considerable attention has been 
paid to the description and analysis of the impact that conflicts have on education and to the 
question of how schools, teachers, and students can be protected (O’Malley 2007, 2010; 
UNESCO 2010). Much attention has also focused on explaining the connections between 
education and conflict. Two major themes have crystallized. The first examines the role of 
education in reproducing social divisions. It emphasizes that by inculcating conflict-related 
ideologies and stereotypes in children, education often reflects social tensions and conflicts in 
society.
1
  The second theme examines the positive effect that education can have in conflict and 
post-conflict situations and how this might be achieved.
2
 Within the latter theme, two important 
subthemes have emerged: first, education for peace – schools as places where different 
perspectives can come together in a positive way, nurturing insight and helping people to learn to 
resolve problems (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004; Evans 2008); and second, the ways 
that education can provide physical, psychosocial, and cognitive protection for children in 
conflict (Winthrop and Kirk 2008; Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003). 
Authors working on all these themes view education contextually. They highlight the 
complexity and embeddedness of education in society, as well as education’s implications in 
conflict. Despite the above-noted advances in the understanding of connections between 
education and conflict, we see an important research gap that merits attention: how school 
grounds, students, and staff are becoming targets for attack for reasons that have little to do with 
education per se (see e.g. Sommers 2002).   
                                           
1 Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004; Burde et al. 2005; Gallagher 2005: Barakat 2008 
2 Davies 2004; Burde et al. 2005; Betancourt et al. 2008; Davies and Talbot 2008 
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Policymakers, activists, and scholars point out facts about certain types of attacks, and the 
motives behind them. For example, Graça Machel (1996, 47) notes that schools can be targeted 
during war because of their high profile: “In rural areas, the school building may be the only 
substantial permanent structure.” Additionally, Robin Shields and Jeremy Rappleye (2008, 
quoting Caddell 2002 and Sharma 2004) suggest that school attacks in Nepal, connected as they 
are with the state, should be understood as symbolic attacks on the state. 
However, even the most systematic and engaged efforts to understand the tactical 
significance of schools remain brief, factual, and anecdotal. According to Susan Nicolai and Carl 
Triplehorn (2003, 3):  
 
Schools may not always be safe: for example, Chechen schools have been bombed during 
class hours because they were deemed to be sheltering military targets and grenades have 
been thrown into classrooms (Peterson 2001). Teachers too may be at risk: in Colombia 
and Sudan, teachers have been threatened and killed (McCallin 2001). Education may be 
connected to recruitment by facilitating access to children; in Sudan, for instance, schools 
have been used as a convenient way of assembling young men for military service 
(Sesnan 1998). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), schools have been a 
common site of child recruitment by Rwandan-backed rebel groups. 
  
Brendan O’Malley (2007; 2010) presents a more systematic list of what motivates parties in 
conflict to target schools. His Education Under Attack reports (2007, 2010) state that, among 
other things, parties may seek to undermine the authority of the state, to take revenge, to show 
strength, to drive out intellectuals, to recruit, to terrorize, to degrade infrastructure, to abduct for 
ransom, and/or to occupy premises. Such lists, although informative, provide little idea as to how 
motives for attacking schools might be related to one another and might possibly be specific to 
schools.  
In short, it is well-known that schools are targeted in conflicts for reasons unrelated to the 
educational process. However, thus far few studies have gone beyond the identification of 
different motives that parties in conflict may have. Consequently, our understanding of the 
phenomenon remains limited, as does our ability to address its policy implications. As the 
UNESCO (2010, 112) report Protecting Education from Attack points out, “the real nature of 
who and what is targeted, the reasons behind attacks, and trends over time are often not well 
understood.”  As the report also notes, there is a need for research into the underlying causes, 
motives, and nature of attacks on education.   
These concerns motivated our research project, which explores the role of schools in the 
1996–2006 conflict between the government and Maoists in Nepal. This article seeks to answer 
the following research question: what rationales were behind the targeting of schools in the 
conflict between the government and the Maoists in Nepal? Specifically, this study moves away 
from an opaque and undifferentiated concept of “attack” and focuses on the role of education in 
conflict by developing a conceptualization of “attacks” as tactical targeting of schools. In this 
study, schools are formally organized institutions for all levels of education, including buildings 
and premises, staff, and students. By tactical targeting of schools we mean actions involving 
schools that arise from operational decision making intended to serve larger political or military 
purposes. In other words, we look into why parties in conflict might consider schools as useful in 
battle. Our key argument is that schools offer parties in conflict important qualities and 
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resources. Our analysis identifies physical and symbolic qualities and human and financial 
resources as the main considerations. 
We focus on the case of the 1996–2006 conflict in Nepal between the government of 
Nepal and the rebel forces led by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), known in the literature 
as “the Maoists.” These forces, promoting a Maoist form of communism, initiated armed battle 
in 1996 in order to overturn the government and move toward the establishment of a Maoist 
regime. 
A prime reason for concentrating on the conflict in Nepal is that the targeting of schools 
was significant, as indicated by available reports. The educational infrastructure and numbers of 
students and staff potentially affected by the conflict were clearly substantial. Official enrolment 
numbers have been disputed (Graner 2006), but the Government of Nepal reports that in 2010 
almost eight million students (from primary to higher education) were enrolled in Nepal 
(Ministry of Education 2010).  
Another reason for studying this conflict in particular is that it took place in one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Many other conflicts take place in poor countries, as noted by 
Julia Paulson and Jeremy Rappleye (2007, 341): “The vast majority of recent conflicts are fought 
within national borders and do not play out on conventional, demarcated battlefields.” More and 
more of the world’s armed conflicts are local and regional wars fought predominantly in poor 
countries within weak or failed states (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008, 474, quoting UNDP 
2005, 12). Nine of the ten countries lowest on the human development index have experienced 
some form of armed conflict since the 1990s (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008, 474). Thus, this 
study contributes a potentially significant understanding of the situation of schools in many other 
conflicts.  
We first introduce the conflict in Nepal in which our contribution is rooted. We then 
discuss the data collection methods of this study. The results section elaborates the different 
types of qualities and resources that schools provided to both Maoists and the Nepali 
government. Finally, we draw our insights together to discuss their potential broader 
implications. 
 
 
The Conflict in Nepal 
 
On 13 February 1996, the CPN started a guerrilla war against the government of Nepal that 
would claim the lives of more than 13,000 individuals and displace more than 100,000 residents. 
This so-called People’s War of Nepal was launched from six comparatively disadvantaged 
districts in mid-western and western Nepal.
3
 Initially, as actions were localized and on a 
relatively small scale, and did not involve many casualties, the war received little attention. At 
first, only the police were dispatched to deal with the Maoists. Over the years, the conflict 
intensified, and the army (government forces) was called in. Although the conflict spread to 
many of Nepal’s districts, it continued to be concentrated in rural areas. After a failed ceasefire 
in November 2001, the conflict became bloodier than ever (Thapa 2003). In January 2003, King 
Gyanendra succeeded in getting the Maoists to agree to another ceasefire, but this one lasted only 
                                           
3 As S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates (2005) have shown, conflict was most intense in areas that were most 
disadvantaged in terms of human development indicators (income per capita, educational attainment, and 
longevity) and land holdings.  
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until April 2003, after which the conflict intensified again, with the Maoists gaining control of 
most of the rural areas. 
 On 1 February 2005, King Gyanendra took all executive power into his own hands. 
However, an alliance between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) consequently 
came about and generated the People’s Movement of April 2006 which eventually forced 
Gyanendra to step down. This initiated a peace process between the Maoists and the political 
parties that ended the decade-long war (International Crisis Group 2006a, 2006b). After two 
years of negotiations, free elections were held for a Constituent Assembly, which was to draft a 
new Constitution. The CPN scored a decisive victory in the elections but did not attract enough 
votes to secure a majority. On 18 August 2008, the Maoist chief, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better 
known under his guerrilla name Prachanda, was sworn in as prime minister of the new coalition 
government. Prachanda stepped down the next year over conflict within the coalition, and to date 
relations between the CPN and other political parties in Nepal continue to be tense. Although the 
“peace process” continues and the CPN is no longer engaging in acts of violence, it has not 
abandoned activism or the option of revolution. 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
How was the tactical significance of schools in Nepal established in this study? Given the open-
ended nature of our research question, our approach was exploratory and, therefore, qualitative 
and largely inductive in nature. We decided to conduct unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews of people who, because of their knowledge or experience of the conflict, could 
provide information about our research question. Fieldwork and analysis complemented each 
other. In due course, we started discovering patterns in the data, developed the theoretical notion 
of schools as tactical targets, and clarified the nature and value of the Nepal case.  
Our primary data were collected between September and December 2007. We conducted 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews with 67 individuals and visited seven schools in 
different parts of the country. We also conducted three informal group interviews, involving 
different numbers and types of participants. These informal group discussions developed during 
visits to schools, where staff introduced us to groups of students. Group interviews took place 
with two classes of bachelor degree students and one class of primary school students.  
For the most part, we could not directly access Maoist or government forces in order to 
establish their tactical reasoning and action. However, through discussions with people with 
close and often direct knowledge and experience of the conflict, we could establish the nature of, 
and plausible logic behind, schools’ tactical significance. 
We started to explore the issue through conversations with a wide range of people 
involved in the conflict. We spoke to teachers, principals, students, and parents, but also to NGO 
staff, activists, and political leaders (Maoist and non-Maoist), government officials, journalists, 
and experts. Early interviewees were selected for their experiences in, or knowledge about, 
education and the conflict in Nepal. With the iterative development of the research, criteria for 
selection of interviewees became more specific. We moved to snowball sampling and directly 
contacting people who could share with us the more specific knowledge or experiences in which 
we were interested. One important criterion was direct exposure to conflict relating to 
involvement with education. As our interest became more specific and focused during the 
fieldwork, so did our questions during the interviews. At the same time, we sought to maintain 
  5 
spread, so that we would not end up with biased data. We made sure to meet informed 
individuals in different localities, including teachers, principals, students (from primary schools 
to undergraduates at the university level), and parents.
4
  
The schools we visited were highly diverse. We made sure to include in our research both 
private and public educational institutions. Schools were also diverse in size, both physically and 
in terms of numbers of students attending. Some schools consisted of large compounds, 
comprising spacious grounds and large concrete buildings. Others consisted of little more than a 
few rooms. Schools were also diverse in terms of wealth. Some had spacious and well-furnished 
rooms, and facilities in working order. Others consisted of little more than a few run-down 
rooms. 
 The interviews were conducted in four locales. Locale A
5
 is a village in Kathmandu 
Valley. Locale B is a town in the hilly area of central Nepal. It is an urban area to which many 
people from the surrounding areas fled during the insurgency. Locale C is a district in the 
Himalayan region of Nepal, which is one of the least developed regions in the country. The 
district headquarters is a little village on the top of a hill. Several villages are close to the 
headquarters, on surrounding hilltops. However, a lot of villages lie deep in the mountains and 
are only accessible by walking for days. The headquarters of Locale C represents the only 
developed part of the district: it has the higher secondary school, government forces' 
headquarters, and a hospital. It is also the headquarters of the political parties, the District 
Education Officer (DEO), and NGOs working in the district. The district itself saw a lot of 
Maoist activity during the insurgency, being so remote from the areas of Nepal where the 
government troops had a strong foothold. During the insurgency, many government officials 
(including teachers) fled to the headquarters to escape the fighting. Finally, 31 interviews were 
conducted in Kathmandu; mostly with experts (journalists, researchers, NGO staff, government 
officials) on the conflict and on education in Nepal.  
Apart from fieldwork, we also used secondary data, including 20 reports by Nepali and 
international NGOs and 18 Nepali English language newspaper articles. We selected these for 
their ability to contribute to the development of our insights by providing accounts indicating, 
confirming, and specifying how schools were tactical targets. We collected and analyzed these 
secondary data before, during, and after the fieldwork period. Our interview material and 
secondary data thus complement each other, offering a form of triangulation. Furthermore, we 
could build on, and integrate, a number of recent scientific publications on the conflict in Nepal.  
 
 
Results: How School Qualities and Resources Made Them Tactical Targets 
 
Certain characteristics that make schools places of societal prominence in Nepali society under 
conditions of peace are the same characteristics that make them vulnerable under conditions of 
                                           
4 A few limitations of the data can be pointed out. Snowball sampling can lead to biases. We have tried to negate 
this sampling bias by “following” a number of “snowballs” and interviewing people in different types of locales and 
from different economic, social, and political backgrounds.  Another limitation of this study is that most 
respondents were male. This derives from the fact that most teachers, students, and principals in Nepal are male, 
but may also be partly due to the sampling technique, as well as to the fact that the interviewer and his 
interpreters were male. In any case, the possibility of divergent female perspectives was not explored in this 
project.  
 
5 To protect respondents’ identities, we do not reveal exact locales. To protect identities we have also changed 
respondents’ names 
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conflict. Schools are tactical targets because they offer different types of qualities and resources 
to parties in conflict.  
Firstly, schools were tactically significant for the Nepali parties in conflict because of 
physical properties that made them relatively unique in the rural Nepali landscape, offering 
functional amenities.  
Secondly, the symbolic meaning of schools in Nepal made schools tactically significant. 
Their symbolic meaning was strategically important in that they stood for normalcy and a sign of 
a functioning state.  
Thirdly, schools offered access to human resources. More concretely: schools provided 
access to students as potential supporters and militants, and access to teachers as influential 
people within their communities. 
Fourthly, schools offered financial resources to the parties in conflict, by offering access 
to school staff as holders of (rurally scarce) cash that could be extorted from them. 
 
 
Physical Properties 
 
Schools were tactically important for both Maoist and government forces because of their 
prominence in Nepal in terms of physical properties. Schools are often the largest and most 
spacious complexes for many miles around, and can easily be put to use for military purposes. 
Rooms are easily converted into housing for combatants, both government and Maoist. In 
addition, there are the school grounds: large, flat, and open areas ideally suited for holding 
gatherings, making speeches, conducting cultural programs or parades. Our research particularly 
points to the Maoists use of schools in this manner. Indeed, indoctrination was an important part 
of Maoist campaigning, and local populations were often gathered in schools to carry out 
indoctrination programs.  
Schools were thus attractive to both parties in the conflict in terms of the structures they 
had to offer. In the mountainous parts of Nepal, flat and open spaces and large buildings are hard 
to come by. Villages consist of small houses and huts, often spread over hilly terrain, cut through 
by steep and winding paths, and surrounded by steep mountain slopes. There is possibly a 
slightly larger open space in the centre of the village. There may be a few two-story buildings 
there: a guesthouse, or a government office. So the school and its grounds are very attractive 
places that often service not only the village itself, but also surrounding villages that do not have 
schools of their own. Schools were confiscated by Maoist and government forces alike to use as 
barracks, or even bunkers, because this was often easier and cheaper than building temporary 
structures that would otherwise be necessary. NGO reports on the conflict in Nepal refer to 
different instances in which this happened. According to Watchlist on Children and Armed 
Conflict (2005), Maoists would suspend classes and use the school as they saw fit. Respondents 
suggested that Maoists took schools as barracks or grounds because the government troops 
would not then attack: the students could function as a human shield, and the government troops 
would rather not destroy school premises. 
 
The Maoists used schools to hide. Schools became war areas. They thought: a school is a 
student area, so the police, soldiers will not bomb there. They won’t do anything with a 
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school. Students and Maoists also look similar. Mostly teenagers are in the PLA.
6
 
(Rajkumar Chhetri, researcher, District Education Office)
 
 
 
Another example provided by the report is that of an operation in Achham district in 2004, when 
the Maoists dug trenches around schools as defense barriers against the government troops in 
case of attack: 
 
On October 29, 2004, Kantipur reported that Maoists are digging trenches (200 meters 
long and 3 meters deep) inside many of the district’s 58 schools to facilitate retaliation 
against security forces in the case of attack … According to the report, Maoists have 
coerced students, teachers and parents to participate in the digging effort.  
 
Respondents declared that the government forces sometimes attacked schools occupied by 
Maoists, but they also explained that the government forces would also take over school 
structures and grounds for their own barracks.  
 
The army made camp in one school area. They said they were there for security. All 
students were scared at that time, because they feared an encounter with the rebels. The 
admission rate of the school decreased. The army would bomb at nighttime, just to 
threaten the terrorists. Local students were always frightened. The sound of guns is 
normal to us. (Keshav Gaire, community leader) 
 
Sometimes, schools remained in session. An Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN, a 
UN initiative) report mentions that “children have to pass through the security checks to reach 
their classes” (IRIN 2005), but students were fearful of being caught in the crossfire between the 
armed forces and stayed away from class. Another report mentions that the government troops 
used schools as barracks. The government troops could surround the school with barbed wire and 
walk around with weapons in the schools, sometimes even while classes were being conducted 
inside (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2005). 
Many respondents mention similar reasons for both the government troops and the Maoists to 
use schools. They refer to the specific qualities that structures and grounds offer to the parties in 
conflict: 
 
Easy. They are isolated. They have rooms and an open playground. They were the obvious 
choice. Schools are where elections are held, where health camps are held, etc. For the 
Maoists, they also had an added advantage: schools provided a big parade ground. So they 
could show their forces. (Raj Tamang, writer/researcher) 
 
In many schools, the government troops made base camp. Because there they have rooms, a 
lot of space, grounds. Nepal does not have many security posts. During the insurgency, they 
had to react quickly, so schools were easy to use. Maoists also had base camps in schools. On 
hillsides, it could be cold, chilly, rainy. So schools were more comfortable. In schools, they 
could also train cadres. (Pradip Thapa, school principal) 
 
                                           
6 People’s Liberation Army, armed wing of the CPN. 
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A school can provide lodging, food. They could give seminars. They had interaction with the 
students. Schools have a large open space. They are with many. They cannot lodge in a 
single house. But they can in schools. (Ashok Siwakoti, school campus chief) 
 
 
Symbolic Meaning 
 
The tactical significance of schools lay also in their symbolic meaning in Nepali society. Open 
and functioning schools represent an important instance of normalcy. One Maoist strategy in the 
conflict consisted of undermining normalcy, thereby undermining the powers that be. Maoists 
sought to pressure the government to comply with their demands by organizing bandhs – an 
important element in the South Asian repertoire of political action – involving a suspension of 
commercial and formally organized collective activity in an area, such as a town. During a 
bandh, trade, production, administration, transportation, as well as education are put on hold. 
Bandhs may last for a day, a week, or even longer.  
 Save the Children conducted research on educational 
programs that they have been running in two Nepali districts. In one of these districts, Kavre, 
children had lost a third of their school days due to frequent bandhs. When schools tried to resist 
the call to strike, rebels forced them to close (Save the Children 2007). If schools did not respond 
to Maoist instructions to close, there could be severe repercussions. For example, according to 
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (2005), on 9 June 2004 the (private) Modern Indian 
School in Kathmandu, which defied a four-day bandh imposed by the Maoists, was attacked 
early in the morning, when the school was empty. Gunmen held the school guards at gun point, 
seven school buses were blown up, and several computers were trashed. A related measure taken 
by the Maoists in a number of instances was the forcible, indefinite closure of schools. The 
indefinite closure often came about as a result of the efforts of the Maoist student wing, the All 
Nepal National Free Students’ Union – Revolutionary (ANNFSU-R) (Asian Centre for Human 
Rights 2005). This group often forced schools and colleges, particularly private institutions, to 
close indefinitely in order to press their demands on the government. The Watchlist on Children 
and Armed Conflict (2005) reports that during the 10-year struggle Maoists closed around 700 
private schools throughout the country. However, closing government schools also could be 
tactically attractive for Maoists. Closing such schools could contribute not only to undermining 
normalcy, but also to undermining state authority, especially in rural areas: 
  
The Maoist objective was to disrupt, damage the state. Local cadres first targeted the VDCs 
[sub-district administrative units]. When these were disrupted, local leaders fled to town. 
Thereafter, they went for schools. Schools were the only thing left of the state in 
communities. (Susil Thapa, school principal) 
 
Even though such actions do not necessarily single out schools rather than other institutions, we 
should point out here that, in remote regions, schools are among the few existing formal 
institutions, making them de facto specific targets for bandhs and forced closures. Furthermore, 
during the conflict, many government institutions in rural areas were not functioning, whereas 
schools attempted to continue to operate (Sharma 2004), thereby further strengthening their 
symbolic significance as targets. 
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Human Resources: Students as Potential Supporters 
 
The third purpose schools served were as access points to students who were potential supporters 
and militants. Indeed, the use of schools as recruiting grounds has been widely noted, with regard 
to the conflict in Nepal as well as conflicts elsewhere (McCallin 2001; Nicolai and Triplehorn 
2003; IRIN 2005). Scholars studying the Nepali educational system have noted that education 
was part of the political battle (Caddell 2006; Shields and Rappleye 2008; Pherali 2011). Much 
political conflict between the Maoists and the government occurred on school grounds. In the 
Nepal case, sometimes it would be more apt to speak of a taking over of the school. Ashish 
Chhetri, principal of a high school in Locale C, was a headmaster of a village school during the 
insurgency. He explains how the Maoists chased him and other teachers away:  
 
Two years ago, I was headmaster of a secondary school. One day, the Maoists came and said: 
“the school is ours.” I refused to give the school to them. Then they came into my office and 
said: “All is ours, except you.” Then they beat me up. Later, the Maoists had gathered around 
200 to 400 people in the school grounds. The Maoists started a speech. They said: “Everyone 
must become a Maoist. If you don’t, you are not alive.” People got in a line, and everyone 
had to proclaim that they were Maoist, even a one-month-old child. After some time I left 
that village and came to the headquarters. The DEO placed me in this school. Around 46 
teachers here have fled their villages. (Ashish Chhetri, school principal) 
 
Reportedly, such gatherings of students, staff, other locals, and Maoist forces could then become 
a target for government forces, which would attack the gathering, resulting in injury and death, 
even of teachers and students (ACHR 2005; Amnesty International 2005) 
Maoists abducted students and teachers for indoctrination and recruitment into the 
movement. The modus operandi was to enter a high school and to take all students and teachers 
to a remote area for a few days. Students abducted by the Maoists had different experiences. 
Himal Jha, a student in Kathmandu, recounts his own four-month-long abduction and forced 
participation in the Maoist campaign: 
 
The Maoists wanted me to become involved in their organization. They accused me of being 
a government spy because I knew the DEO personally. They put pressure on me to join. I 
told them: “I would like to study. I’m not interested. I have no intention of fighting against 
Nepali people. I don't want to fight with either the Maoists or the government troops. Both 
are equal to me.” In the end, they forced me to come with them. They took me into their 
movement for four months. They pressured me to conduct some activities in favor of the 
Maoists. I had to convince other people of their ideology. They took me to so many places. In 
the end, I repudiated their program and their actions. I requested them to allow me to 
continue my studies. I said that I was the only son of my family, that I could not be involved 
with them in a long-term relationship. I said: “You have to set me free. You have to give me 
my human rights. You have no right to force me into your organization.” I argued with them 
for a long time. In the end, they let me go.  
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In Locale A, Maoists abducted around 60 students and teachers from their schools and took them 
away for three days. It was allegedly the largest abduction this close to Kathmandu that the 
country had witnessed. A teacher, Bijay Dulal, explained what happened: 
 
The Maoists called us down and informed us that they would abduct us. In total, they 
abducted 48 students and 12 teachers. There were only five Maoists, but they used the threat 
of their gun. They said they wanted to show us that the party is good to people. The Maoist 
area commander himself was a member of the school. They took us on a nine-hour walk. We 
were taken into a large house. There were more students from another district also. There 
were 13 Maoists and 105 abductees. We were given very good food. They didn't behave 
badly and even provided medicine. The following day, they engaged us in talk. There was an 
interaction program. The next day they told us: “you can go home, the program is finished.” 
We were given a very small bit of food and were sent away. We had to find our own way 
back. The whole program looked planned. 
 
His daughter and a student in the school, Bina Dulal, also described her experience: 
 
I was the youngest in my class, Grade 10. When we went away from the school, I started 
crying. The Maoists were kind to me and told me that, if they had known I would be so upset, 
they wouldn't have taken me. During the program, they put questions to us. They tried to 
impose their ideology. We asked them questions: “Why do you attack the educational 
system?” “Why are there so many strikes? Students hate strikes.” “Why are you fighting so 
near our homes?” But their answers were very unsatisfactory. Smiling, they told us that it 
was not so. They denied that their actions had affected education. Nobody was tempted to 
join the Maoists by the program. We weren’t scared of the Maoists. The only thing we would 
be frightened about was an encounter with the army, because it could have become violent.  
 
According to Amnesty International (2005), tens of thousands of school children have been 
abducted in this way. Some children did not return from these sessions, and it is suspected that 
they joined the Maoist force. IRIN (2005) asserts that the Maoists began specifically to target 
schools in 2000. From that year onward, the number of abducted students increased each year. 
The Community Study and Welfare Centre (CSWC), a Nepali NGO working for Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs), told IRIN that between July and September 2004 nearly 5,000 
students were abducted by Maoists. Our fieldwork and available reports do not reveal similar 
abductions of students by government. 
Thus, our respondents as well as other reports make clear that the functioning of schools was 
clearly hampered or even made impossible by activities such as abductions and in-school 
indoctrination. However, analyses so far have paid little or no attention to schools as a societal 
resource in the sense that they were attractive as places for gathering support. Although neither 
reports nor our own data speak of government forces using schools for this purpose, respondents 
explained to us why schools were an ideal spot for Maoists to spread the word of their rebellion 
and their ideology: 
 
Schools are an easy place to campaign and gather people. It is the best place. Maoists have 
targeted schools because they want to recruit students. They wanted the new generation. For 
marches or rallies, they close the school and then take the students. Everyone comes to 
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schools. It is easy to give speeches, because everyone is there. (Birendra Thapa, employee 
international NGO) 
 
Why do Maoists focus on schools? In villages, they held their programs in public places. In 
schools it is easy to gather people. Schools are built in the centre. They have a large open 
area. It is easy to gather crowds. This is the main reason. (Rohini Chand and Ashmita 
Gorkhali, members of Maoist student wing) 
 
Such analyses by locals give a clear indication of why schools were tactical targets, offering 
access to an extraordinary number of social relations through their many ties in communities. In 
addition, in Nepal schools are traditionally the places where elections or health programs are 
held. A related benefit is that people are used to schools being the center of community activity. 
Schools are thus not only places where students can be found; they are often situated in the heart 
of the locality and looked upon by local populations as places where key developments in society 
take their course. Schools are therefore an ideal base for campaigns and rallying local 
populations. 
 
 
Human Resources: Teachers and Their Social Role in Communities  
 
Schools formed a societal resource also because they offered access to local populations through 
teachers. Both government forces and Maoists sought support from teachers, and also kept a 
keen eye on teachers as potential supporters of the other side, and sought to exert control 
(Paulson and Rappleye 2007; Pherali 2011). Government forces reportedly arrested, tortured, and 
killed teachers they suspected of supporting the Maoists (Amnesty International 2005; Pherali 
2011). In an IRIN publication, a teacher relates the story of how he was abducted by the Maoists. 
Dipendra Roka, a teacher from Salle village in Rukum district, was forced to work for the 
Maoists for two years. His task was to explain the Maoist ideology to other teachers and to 
students (IRIN 2006). A case from The Rising Nepal (2005) also tells the story of a teacher:  
 
The security forces have rescued a 58-year old teacher of Ramjakot, Tanahu district. Eight 
Maoists, including a woman, called him out of his home and kidnapped him. He was accused 
of spying against the terrorists, refusing to accept Maoist principles, refusing to make 
donations and close the school, teaching Sanskrit, and refusing to include the Maoist 
curriculum in school. The teacher describes his days with the Maoists as “a living hell.” 
 
Teachers have been abducted; but also in other ways, non-violent as well as violent, they have 
been coerced into joining sides, stopping perceived anti-actions, mobilizing, and indoctrinating 
others. Keshab Bhattarai, president of the Teachers’ Union of Nepal, believes that teachers are 
targeted in order to control the educational system and use it to instruct the Maoist ideology 
(IRIN 2006).  
All this can at least partly be motivated by the fact that teachers in Nepali society often have 
a social role going beyond the classroom. Teachers may have key positions as respected, 
knowledgeable figures in rural Nepali society (Save the Children 2006). According to 
respondents, teachers may have the role of gurus, esteemed persons with the ability to guide 
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members of society in a broad sense, their authority rooted in their knowledge. As respondents 
explained: 
 
If you go to a remote area, the only respected person is the teacher. There are no other state 
officials, beyond the district headquarters. Teachers are seen as the guru for everything. 
(Keshav Gupta, human rights consultant) 
 
The Maoists thought that teachers and students who are able to read and write could more 
easily understand their instructions and ideology. So they could transfer the Maoists’ ideas to 
the people in the community. To reach uneducated masses, they used teachers and students. 
(Prabin Himanshu, conflict officer international NGO) 
 
Teachers are educated people. If you tell them something about a populist movement, they 
could effectively communicate it to the villagers. Their network is so extensive. Teachers 
live in the village. It is easy for them to pass on the message. In some cases, teachers are the 
only educated persons around. (Manoj Joshi, university educational researcher) 
 
According to Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics, rural literacy was 46 percent in 2001, as 
compared to 74 percent for urban areas. However, there can be considerable differences between 
regions and income levels (CBS 2003). Even if teachers cannot entirely be said to be “the only 
educated persons around,” according to the respondents they do play a pivotal role in rural 
society. In rural, remote, and/or poor communities, where many members are illiterate or have 
only a few years of schooling, a school teacher may very well be the most educated person 
present. Many of the more educated people move to the urban areas, but teachers work and live 
in the rural communities and are in frequent contact with many members of those communities. 
However, what matters here is not just their many connections; with the ability to explain the 
concepts of ideology to members of the community and to convince them of its merits, teachers 
may have significant influence on local populations’ social awareness and political perspectives. 
Respondents described teachers as outstanding in their ability to understand and communicate 
Maoist ideology to local populations. If the Maoists could get a teacher to take their side, they 
could gain a lot of followers at one stroke. In this way, teachers could fulfill the role of 
ideological broker between Maoists and villagers. Thus, it is connections combined with 
teachers’ potential guru status that make teachers significant as tactical targets for both 
government and Maoists. As our respondents explained: 
 
We can communicate and mobilize a society. We have a large network of parents. We have 
been educated. We know how to handle society, how to speak in a polite way. Also, if one 
teacher is converted, he can convert others. (Sushant Devkota, teacher) 
 
The school is the epicenter of the countryside. If you exploit teachers, you will get 100,000 
followers at one stroke. Children follow teachers. (Himal Koirala, university professor) 
 
Teachers are looked up to in rural areas, they are esteemed very highly. They are the only 
ones who are educated, the only ones who read newspapers. Any opposition from teachers is 
not to be taken lightly. Maoists thought teachers to be their adversaries. (Prashant Gadal, 
writer/researcher) 
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In this connection, respondents also pointed out the more general phenomenon of teacher 
politicization, with teachers and teacher unions being aligned to political parties, and teachers 
playing a key role in political mobilization and conflict more generally. For instance: 
 
Political pressure is the main problem. Other political parties put pressure on teachers too. 
Teachers are the competent persons in the community. They can convince and lead the 
community. They can read. The parties want teachers, so that they can control the 
community. (Navin Tamrakar, school principal) 
 
Because of the political role that teachers can play in communities, they have also been targeted 
as enemies. If a teacher was against the insurgency, or preached against Maoist ideology, they 
risked violent reactions from the Maoists. Government and government troops, on the other 
hand, targeted teachers for their alleged alignment with the Maoists. 
All in all, what we see here is that parties in conflict seek out teachers because of their 
ties to many other individuals on whom they can be expected to have an influence. And it is at 
least partly through their formal association with the school that these parties in the conflict are 
able to identify potentially influential individuals and affect the role they play in Nepali society.  
 
 
Financial Resources  
 
One more way in which schools formed a societal resource was the access that they offered to 
financial resources. It appears that schools represented this resource for the Maoists in particular; 
neither our fieldwork nor available reports revealed the involvement of government forces in 
such practices. Although we cannot verify this, it can be suggested that government would have 
been less dependent on such resources and that such practices would also undercut the desired 
order and government legitimacy.  
For Maoist forces, the presence of a school signaled the presence of financial resources in the 
form of persons with money or access to money that could be located and accessed through the 
school. In rural Nepal, Maoists extorted money from school principals and teachers; failure to 
comply regularly resulted in violence (Pherali 2011, 137). The Maoists extorted money from 
other people as well, including business people and tourists. However, according to respondents, 
in rural areas, school principals and teachers were often the only ones with cash available. People 
in rural areas generally have very little cash income. Some may have assets, like land, or houses, 
or cattle, but not much cash. Teachers are known to be among the few in the countryside to get a 
regular salary for their work. It may not be much, but for the villagers, and for the Maoists, the 
amounts they could extract apparently were still worth the effort. Maoists demanded money from 
school principals and teachers for their campaigns, using pressure and fear to extract it. If the 
principal or teacher did not pay, the Maoists might force the school to close, or sometimes the 
principal or teacher was abducted or abused. Mahesh Upreti, the principal of a private school in 
Locale B, recounts how it was to be a headmaster dealing with the Maoists: 
  
Before, we had to contribute to the Maoists. We had to give money, give them a fee. We had 
to obey. Once, we had to bargain with a Maoist outside the city, in some remote area. We, all 
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the principals, were called out of town. About 40 meters outside of town, we met a Maoist. 
The first thing he did, he showed us a hand grenade. Then he started negotiations.  
 
Tony Vaux et al. (2006) assert that the violence against schools and teachers was mostly 
collateral. The Maoists did not try to change or stop education by attacking schools. Rather, they 
claimed that they wanted the educational system to continue to function. Indeed, it was an 
important source of income for them (Vaux et al. 2006). Also, many of our respondents 
mentioned that teachers often had to pay some of their salary to the Maoists, varying from 5 
percent to 20 percent. Kishore Giri, principal of a government campus in Locale B, was one of 
those forced to donate money to the Maoists: 
 
I often get letters from the Maoists asking me to support them, to join in their meetings. But I 
never go. I was ordered to pay fees to them, both as a teacher and in the name of my school. I 
never intended to give them money. They did not dare to come to the campus, because it is in 
the headquarters and the army is so close. But they came to my village house to get the 
money. 
 
NGO reports mention this levy as well. For example, as Amnesty International (2005, 4) 
reported: “In areas under CPN (Maoist) control teachers are compelled to pay part of their 
income to the CPN (Maoist) as well as attend ‘political education’ sessions and teach the Maoist 
curriculum.” The Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (2005) report mentions that these 
donations often had to be paid in large chunks. During the period of Dasain, Nepal’s national 
fifteen-day religious festival, teachers would travel to the district headquarters to collect four 
months’ salary plus their Dasain bonus; but then they were afraid to return to the village, 
because they feared the Maoists would come to collect their “tax.” In addition, if the government 
forces got wind of the teachers’ monetary contribution to the Maoists, they would accuse them of 
being Maoist supporters. As a result, teachers remained trapped in district headquarters, and 
many village schools were forced to stay closed after Dasain.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Our analysis shows that schools in Nepal were targeted because of their physical properties, 
symbolic meaning, and the access to human and financial resources that they offered to parties in 
conflict. However, this begs the question of the wider significance of our results.  What are the 
implications of this insight, beyond the Nepal case, given that many of the qualities discussed are 
contextual in nature? Indeed, few countries have the bandh as an element in their repertoire of 
political action. Teachers do not have the same status in every conflict as they do in rural Nepal. 
Schools and teachers are not always obvious targets for extortion; and school grounds are not 
always the obvious place for assembling community members and establishing barracks. We can 
see strategies grounded in local culture here – for example, the guru status of teachers and the 
bandh – and some school targeting is partly related to the specific geographic and socio-
economic conditions in Nepal. 
That said, the analysis here does seem applicable to other conflict areas outside Nepal. 
Particularly in rural areas, there may be few structures, apart from schools, that can provide 
parties in conflict with barracks, meeting places, and leverage over the state. Similarly, there are 
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even fewer institutions that provide ties to people who have other resources to offer, such as 
funds, personnel, or potential support. This suggests that the strategic significance of schools 
may be applicable in local or regional conflicts that occur under similar conditions of low 
development. In such conflicts, parties will seek financial resources from coffers other than those 
of the state and be dependent on locating structures for military operation, mobilization, and 
recruitment other than those of the state.  
By deepening our understanding of how and why schools are targeted, this article seeks 
to develop insights on how to counter schools’ tactical significance and thus their vulnerability to 
“attacks.” In this sense, our study joins the debate on the prevention of, and response to, the 
targeting of schools by parties in conflict by highlighting the various resources a school offers. 
Existing literature points out a number of possible prevention and response strategies. Brendan 
O’Malley (2007, 27-33, 2010, 109-127) identifies different possible types of action. One is that 
of armed response, involving armed forces coming to protect schools, students and staff. A 
second focuses on community defense and involves popular resistance to attacks. A third 
promotes resilience, which can involve the relocation of classes away from large, easily targeted 
buildings, and then returning to them swiftly after the attacks have concluded. A fourth 
possibility is the development and enforcement of codes of conduct or rules and pressure on 
parties in conflict to keep away from schools. A fifth involves the negotiation with parties. 
Finally, Brendan O’Malley discusses the nature and quality of education itself..  
A prominent approach to the question of prevention and response, broadly accepted by 
practitioners, organizations, and scholars, has been that of schools as safe zones; in Nepal too, a 
multi-stakeholder initiative for the development and institutionalization of schools as safe zones 
was developed.
7 Supporters of this approach acknowledge that schools themselves contribute to 
conflict, are affected by it, or have a role in it. In order to counter this reality, they advocate the 
development of codes of conduct (Caddell 2006; Wedge 2008), peace education (Wedge 2008), 
and encouragement of popular resistance (O’Malley 2010).  
While we acknowledge the importance and validity of these ideas, this article’s findings point to 
potential limitations of the different ideas on prevention and response that have been developed 
thus far. First, we see in these ideas little attention to the motives of parties to target schools and 
the reasons why schools are actually “attacked.” A better understanding of these reasons would 
contribute to the protection of schools, especially because it may be very difficult to convince 
warring parties to leave the educational sector alone. By doing so, parties in conflict would 
actually rob themselves of important strategic resources. Secondly, many prevention and 
response strategies involve organizations beyond the locality itself, including the state and 
international institutions. Thirdly, many involve a longer-term orientation. Fourtly, some involve 
extraordinary courage by civilians in the face of armed attack.  
Our findings lead us to suggest the potential importance of shorter-term actions that locals 
themselves can take without facing great risks. Brendan O’Malley (2007) pointed out that, in 
Afghanistan, UNICEF is helping local people set up smaller school units closer to or within 
communities, even inside homes. Dana Burde’s discussion of community-based schools in 
Afghanistan (Burde 2010) also points in this direction. Such strategies, which change the 
institutional and physical setup of schools while maintaining their function, may be advisable in 
many conflict contexts. To become less attractive as a tactical target, schools change their 
organizational structures and physical setup, thus reducing their prominence and recognizability 
as places of tactical importance. Relocation to makeshift premises, fragmentation of the 
                                           
7 Caddell 2006; O’Malley 2007, 2010; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008; Wedge 2008; Smith 2010 
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institution into smaller units, does not do away with the attractiveness of school buildings, but 
other dimensions that we discussed would be removed or at least disguised and decreased, 
making staff and students less accessible as targets. Importantly, this is something locals 
themselves could do, swiftly, without the need for interventions by NGO or international 
institutions, large financial resources, or long-term process orientations. To best protect schools, 
children, and school staff from being targeted by parties in conflict, it may be well worth 
temporarily decreasing schools’ societal prominence, especially in rural and low-income 
contexts.  
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